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Since combustion of fossil fuels can release a large amount of greenhouse gases into the 
atmosphere thereby accelerate the rate of climate change, biofuel from biomass has been 
suggested as a fuel of the future. We argue that if biofuel is to become a fuel of the 
future, the principal (government or social planner) should make monetary incentive 
payments to farmers willing to dedicate their farm land to growing bioenergy crops. The 
problem arises when the principal does not have information on whether these biofuel 
farmers are actually low-cost types or high-cost types. The idea of a biofuel incentive 
payment program is to distribute more incentive payments to high-cost farmers so as to 
induce them to participate in the program. Principal-agent model is used to study the 
effect of hidden information on the government’s incentive payments to biofuel farmers.  
Results show that with complete information both low-cost and high-cost type farmers 
have incentives to produce biofuel crops under the government contract. When 
information asymmetry is considered, low-cost farmers earn extra payments, but their 
optimal productivity level remains unchanged. In this second-best outcome with 
asymmetric information, high-cost farmers’ optimal level of productivity and incentive 
payments that they received depend on the marginal costs of raising tax revenue. 
Generally, our results suggest that the government’s biofuel incentive payment program 
may not be an effective tool in inducing biofuel crop production if asymmetric 










1.  Introduction 
Biofuel from biomass is often suggested as a future replacement for fossil fuel. 
According to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
1, fossil fuels burned to 
run cars and trucks, heat homes and businesses, and power factories are responsible for 
about 98% of U.S. carbon dioxide emissions, 24% of methane emissions, and 18% of 
nitrous oxide emissions. Combustion of these fossil fuels is considered to be the largest 
contributing factor to the release of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. Increasing 
concentrations of these greenhouse gases are likely to accelerate the rate of climate 
change. Biomass can play an important role in reducing greenhouse gas emissions and air 
pollution. Biomass fuels recycle atmospheric carbon, minimizing global warming 
impacts since zero net carbon dioxide is emitted during biomass combustion. Other 
environmental benefits of using biomass energy include provision of wildlife habitats and 
consequent improved biodiversity - energy crops may provide increased habitat diversity 
within the agricultural landscape. By utilizing biomass energy, society can also benefit 
from an improvement in rural economies due to the development of local industries in 
forestry and agriculture. 
              The production of biofuel feedstocks from agricultural and forestry sources has 
been considered for many years, particularly after the 1970’s energy crisis. The 
sustainability of bioenergy in the future will depend on fossil fuel prices. The 
international price of fossil fuels is in many cases kept artificially low by government 
subsidies aimed at protecting domestic fuel security and regional employment (Hall and 
Scrase, 1998). So long as fossil fuels are cheaply available in the market due to 
government subsidies, it is unlikely that biofuel will be considered as a viable source of 
                                                 
1 http://yosemite.epa.gov/oar/globalwarming.nsf/content/climate.html 4 
 
energy. In order to combat the global climate change and air pollution, incentive payment 
programs may be needed to encourage bioenergy producers to produce biofuels not only 
for use in transportation but also in electricity generation.  With the help of government, 
such incentive programs can be implemented. If biomass is to become a fuel of the 
future, cost reductions must be given a high priority. We can think of biofuels as new and 
potentially marketable products. In order to produce these new products, producers may 
have to adopt new technologies that require unique human capital skills, monitoring of 
the production processes, high quality inputs and capital equipments, etc. Since it is 
costly to incorporate new technologies into the biofuel production process, producers 
may need monetary incentives. Government incentive payments could induce biofuel 
producers to adopt and incorporate new technologies in their production processes, 
provided that the subsidies are higher than the cost of adoption.  
             The objective of this paper is to design an optimal contract that can increase the 
welfare of both the government (i.e. the society) and the producers of bioenergy crops. 
By utilizing biofuels, the society can gain its welfare from the reduction in greenhouse 
gases and air pollution. With the help of government subsidies, biofuel producers can 
also increase their welfare by reducing their production costs and increasing their market 
shares. Principal-agent model is used to construct an optimal contract. The principal in 
this case is the government or social planner, and the agents are producers or farmers who 
grow bioenergy crops. Since the agents have private information, i.e. they know whether 
they are high-cost types or low-cost types, there will be asymmetry of information 
between them and the principal.   
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2.  Literature Review 
Previous studies which include Wu and Babcock (1995), Ahouissoussi (1995), Goodhue 
et al. (2003), and Segerson (1988) have used principal agent models to examine situations 
where information asymmetries are important. Wu and Babcock (1995) use the model to 
design a green payment program which pays farmers directly for the environmental 
benefits they provide. Their green payment program is designed for irrigated corn 
production in the Oklahoma high plains. The program presents farmers with a policy 
menu that consists of combinations of the type of production practices permitted (for 
example, input use and tillage practices) and an accompanying government payment. The 
asymmetry of information between the government and farmers play an integral role in 
program design. Wu and Babcock assume that the government knows only the 
distribution of farmers’ type, but unable to discriminate a particular farmer’s type. Given 
this information asymmetry, farmers may have an incentive to cheat and misrepresent 
their types to obtain favorable combinations of production practices and payments.  Their 
green payment program is designed to provide an incentive for farmers to choose or 
reveal their true types.  Hence the program is second best because of this constraint.                           
                 Ahouissoussi (1995) examines the regional pest control that can lessen the 
externalities associated with mobile pests and pesticide drift with the resulting potential 
enhancement of producers’ net returns. The principal in his case is the Animal and Plant 
Health Inspection Service (APHIS), and the agents are cotton producers. APHIS is 
interested in inducing producers to adopt the regional pest control program. The problem 
arises when producers’ gain in rents from regional pest control will be relatively less for 
those producers experiencing high economic rents without regional pest control. An 6 
 
incentive payment scheme has to be designed to induce producers of different types to 
participate in the program. The principal has limited information on the type of 
producers. Thus, the principal must design an incentive scheme that does well on average 
whatever type of agent is involved.  
                 According to Goodhue et al. (2003), “green payment programs are designed to 
pay farmers for their production of goods other than agricultural output, such as wildlife 
and sustainable practices, and in some cases, to induce them to increase their production 
of these goods”. Goodhue et al. use the principal-agent framework to analyze two 
controversies regarding agricultural green payment programs: 1) whether farmers should 
be paid for their provision of environmental inputs, such as wildlife habitat or paid for 
outputs, such as wildlife populations, and 2) whether programs designed to promote the 
use of sustainable agricultural practices should pay all users, or only new adopters. They 
find that under most conditions it is socially more desirable to pay farmers for inputs than 
for outputs. They also find that for many practices, the social cost of paying only new 
adopters is small. But, for some practices it may be socially preferable to pay both new 
adopters and current users. Segerson (1988) employs an incentive scheme that could be 
used to control non-point pollution in the presence of uncertainty and monitoring 
difficulties.  Her design mechanism is discussed in the context of both a single suspected  
polluter and multiple suspected polluters.    
 
3.  The Model 
The theoretical model of this paper will be similar to Wu and Babcock’s (1995). It will be 
an adverse selection problem where the principal does not know the agent’s private 
information, but the probability distribution of this information is common knowledge. 7 
 
We will assume that the principal and the agent both adopt an optimizing behavior and 
maximize their individual utility. Moreover, the principal is assumed to be a Bayesian 
expected utility maximizer. In designing the agent’s payoff rule, the principal moves first 
as a Stackelberg leader under asymmetric information anticipating the agent’s subsequent 
behavior and optimizing accordingly within the set of available contracts (Laffont and 
Martimort, 2002).    
                   For simplicity, suppose that there are two types of farmers dedicated their 
land to growing bioenergy crops such as switchgrass, willow or poplar: low-cost farmers 
and high-cost farmers. Following Chambers (1992), low-cost farmers have lower 
marginal and total costs over all output levels. Given the existence of information 
asymmetry, the incentive payment program, which is intended for the high-cost farmers, 
will not be able to discriminate between the low-cost and high-cost types. Thus, low-cost 
farmers may have an incentive to imitate the high-cost types and obtain favorable 
combinations of production practices and payments. To solve this problem, the principal 
must design and use the payment scheme to induce farmers to reveal their true types.  
3.1  Farmer’s utility without the contract 
In order to gain a better understanding of changes in a biofuel farmer’s utility when 
he/she accepts the contract, we first determine the farmer’s utility without the contract. 
Let   i x   be the productivity of farm land acres dedicated to growing bioenergy crops, and 
] , [ 2 1 a a ai  be farmer’s private cost for using a unit of land to grow bioenergy crops, 
where i = 1 represents low-cost type farmers and 2  represents high-cost type farmers. 
Specifically, we may think of  i a  as the marginal or opportunity cost of biofuel farmers. 
Clearly,  1 2 a a  since low-cost type biofuel farmers are assumed to be more productive 8 
 
than the high-cost types. The parameter  i a  varies among farmers and defines the type of 
farmers.  The distribution of  i a  is common knowledge, i.e. that the principal knows the 
farmer’s type  i a  with some probabilities,   for the low-cost farmers and  ) 1 (  for the 
high-cost farmers.  Farmers know their own private cost  i a , but it is not specifically 
known to the principal. Therefore,   i a  is considered to be exogenous.  
         Each farmer maximizes his/her utility with respect to the land available for biofuel 
crop production. Farmer’s utility or profit function may be expressed as follows, 
                                            2 , 1 ) ( i x a x py i i i i  
where y is defined as the production function and  pas the production price. The function 
) ( i x y  has the regular properties of a neo-classical production function with  0 (.) y , 
0 (.) y .  i x  and  i a  are as defined above. Each farmer maximizes his/her own utility 
with respect to  i x .  The first order condition (FOC) to farmer’s maximization problem 
can be written as, 
                                            i i i i a x y p a x y p ) ( 0 ) (                                        (1) 
Each farmer equalizes his/her marginal productivity of land with his private opportunity 
cost of using land for biofuel production.  From (1), the optimal productivity of land can 
be obtained and be denoted as i x . Hence, the optimal level of farmer’s utility can be 
expressed as:  i i i i i i x a x py x a ) ( ) , ( . If  0 ) , ( i i i x a , farmers will not have 
incentives to grow biofuel crops. According to Schneider and McCarl (2003), the U.S. 
biofuel production has not proven to be economically feasible without subsidies. They 
argue that there are four possible political justifications for subsidizing biofuels. First, 9 
 
biofuel subsidies serve to support agricultural prices by adding to demand for feedstock 
commodities and in turn supporting agricultural incomes. Second, the biofuel product has 
desirable environmental/health attributes relative to fossil fuels. Third, increased biofuel 
use reduces dependence on petroleum extending the life of existing stocks. Fourth, 
biofuel combustion substantially offsets net GHG emissions relative to fossil fuel 
combustion. Farmers’ profit from growing biofuel crops would likely be negative without 
government subsidy payments. 
3.2  Farmer’s utility with the contract 
The contract includes the productivity of land that farmers dedicated to raising biofuel 
crops,  i x  and the subsidy or transfer payment,  i T  , offered to farmers by the social 
planner. Under the incentive payment contract, the social planner presents farmers with 
the policy menu: ] , [ i i T x , where both the  i x and   i T are specified for each type of farmer. 
In order to compensate farmers for the loss of incomes due to the production of biofuel 
crops, the social planner needs to know the farmer’s profit function. With the contract, 
the farmer’s profit function becomes,  
                                  2 , 1 ) ( ) , ( i T x a x py x a i i i i i i
c
i                       
where  ) , ( i i
c
i x a  is the farmer’s optimal profit with the contract, i.e. with the monetary 
transfer payment,  i T . It must be true that 0 ) , ( i i
c
i x a , otherwise farmers will not 
participate in the payment program.  
3.3   Principal’s objective and utility function  
The principal’s social objective is to support rural employment and reduce the GHG 
emissions through the use of biofuels. With the contract, the principal’s goal is to 10 
 
maximize its social surplus.  In expected utility form, the social surplus (SS) can be 
written as,              
                 ] ) , ( ) (
~
)[ 1 ( ] ) , ( ) (
~
[ 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 T x a x B T x a x B SS
c c  
where  ) (
~
i x B , i =1, 2 in reduced form
2 is the social benefit associated with the use of 
biofuel crops. And it is assumed that 0 ) 0 (
~
B ,  0 (.)
~
B and 0 (.)
~
B .   and  ) 1 ( are 
the probabilities that  farmers will be low-cost types  with private cost,  1 a  and  high-cost 
types with private cost  2 a , respectively. Following Wu and Babcock (1995),    (where
0) is denoted as the marginal cost of raising tax revenue to support the government’s 
transfer payments.  
3.4  The first best case with full information 
In the first best condition, the principal is assumed to be able to observe the productivity 
of each type biofuel farmers, i.e. she knows exactly what each type of farmers’ private 
marginal cost is. Thus, the information is complete. The following principal 
maximization problem determines the first best outcome (FB),  
      ] ) , ( ) (
~
)[ 1 ( ] ) , ( ) (
~
[ 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 , T x a x B T x a x B SS Max
c c
T x i i
     
subject to each farmer’s individual rational or participation constraint (IRC) i.e. 
       IRC1                                     0 ) , ( 1 1 1 x a
c  
       IRC2                                     0 ) , ( 2 2 2 x a
c  
                                                 
2  As suggested by Richard Woodward,  ) (
~
i x B  is written in reduced form.  The reduced form is derived 
because the principal is only interested in the aggregate production of biofuels. In aggregate form it may be 
written as,  )] ( [ )] ( [ )] ( ) ( [ 2 1 2 1 x y B x y B x y x y B , and by taking the derivative with respect to  1 x  
and  2 x yields  )] ( [ 1 x y B and  )] ( [ 2 x y B . From here, the individual benefit function in the reduced form can 
be expressed as   ) (
~
1 x B  for the low-cost types and  ) (
~
2 x B  for the high-cost types.  
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         To induce farmers to participate, the payment scheme must satisfy IRCs, i.e. the 
farmers’ utility with the contract,  ) , ( i i
c
i x a  must be at least as great as their reservation 
utility,  ) , ( i i i x a . For the sake of simplicity, reservation utilities for IRC1 and IRC2 are 
normalized to zero.  
         With complete information, the above IRC1 and IRC2 will bind, because there is no 
reason for the social planner to pay the monetary transfer more than she has to. The 
principal will pay just enough so that IRC1 and IRC2 will bind. Thus, to solve the above 
maximization problem, the principal would maximize her objective function subject to 
each of the two binding IRCs. The first order conditions (FOCs) for the first best outcome 
(FB) of each type of farmers can be expressed as follows, 
For the low-cost type: 
FB FOC1 :   ) (
~ 1















                              (2) 
From (2), the optimal level of land productivity can be obtained and denoted as: 
FB x1  
The first-best optimal transfer payment for the low-cost type can be obtained and written 
as, 
                        ) ( ) , ( 1 1 1 1 1 1
FB FB FB FB x py x a x a T                                                              (3) 
For the high-cost type: 
FB FOC2 : ) (
~ 1















                            (4) 
From (4), the optimal level of land productivity can be obtained and denoted as: 
FB x2 . 
The first-best optimal transfer payment for the high-cost type can be obtained and written 
as, 12 
 
                        ) ( ) , ( 2 2 2 2 2 2
FB FB FB FB x py x a x a T                                                              (5) 
Through the contract with full information, equations (2) and (4) suggest that each type 
of biofuel farmers equalizes his/her marginal productivity of land with his/her private 
opportunity cost minus the social opportunity cost derived from producing bioenergy 
crops. By comparing equations (2) and (4) with equation (1), we may conclude that with 
the contract and complete information, farmer’s marginal productivity decreases by a 
positive amount  ) (
~ 1
i x B (since  0 ) (
~
i x B  and ) 0 . This can be illustrated graphically 
as follows, 
                    ) ( i x y  
                  
                                                     Without the contract 
 
                         i a  
                                                       With the contract and full information (First best case) 
 
         ) (
~ 1
i i x B a  
 
 
                                        i x         
FB
i x                             x           
Figure 1. Optimal land productivity with and without the contract 
  
           The above figure suggests that with the contract and full information, both low-
cost and high-cost type farmers (i = 1, 2) can raise their optimal level of land productivity 
from  i x  to
FB
i x . Hence, the first-best optimal transfer payments (equations 3 and 5) may 
induce farmers to produce more biofuel crops.   
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3.4  The second best case with asymmetric information 
In the second best condition, the principal is assumed to be unable to observe the 
productivity of each type of biofuel farmers. Since farmers have private information 
which cannot be observed by the principal, they have incentives to imitate each other and 
obtain favorable combinations of production practices and payments. To prevent that 
from happening, the principal needs to use the incentive compatible constraints (ICCs) to 
induce biofuel farmers to reveal their true types. As a result of asymmetric information, 
two additional ICCs are added in the second best case as described below. The following 
principal maximization problem determines the second best outcome (SB),  
          ] ) , ( ) (
~
)[ 1 ( ] ) , ( ) (
~
[ 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 , T x a x B T x a x B SS Max
c c
T x i i
     
subject to both the IRCs and the ICCs,  
       IRC1                                     0 ) , ( 1 1 1 x a
c  
       IRC2                                     0 ) , ( 2 2 2 x a
c  
       ICC1                                     ) , ( ) , ( 2 1 1 1 1 1 x a x a
c c        
       ICC2                                     ) , ( ) , ( 1 2 2 2 2 2 x a x a
c c  
ICCs require that each type of biofuel farmers prefers the policy option intended for them 
to the option intended for the other type. Wu and Babcock (1995) indicate that the 
payment program is feasible if it satisfies both the IRCs and ICCs. When the principal 
uses a feasible program, farmers voluntarily choose the policy option intended for them. 
Therefore, by maximizing the above objective function subject to IRCs and ICCs, the 
principal will be able to find a feasible program.  The Lagrangian Mutlipier method can 
be used to solve the above maximization problem but rather difficult to handle. In this 
two-type agent model, the number of constraints calls for more practical path, where we 14 
 
first guess which constraints are binding, then solve the model assuming these constraints 
bind and check ex post that the omitted constraints are strictly satisfied (Laffont and 
Martimort, 2002).  
           The incentive compatibility problem implies that ICC1 will bind but not ICC2. 
Because it is not feasible for high-cost ( 2 a ) type farmers to imitate low-cost ( 1 a ) types, 
there is no incentive exists and thus ICC2 will not bind. The participation problem 
implies that IRC2 will bind. This simplification in the number of constraints leaves us 
only with two remaining constraints, IRC2 and ICC1. Both constraints must be binding at 
the optimum of the principal’s problem
3. The principal problem now is to maximize her 
objective function subject to the binding IRC2 and ICC1. By solving the principal’s 
maximization problem, the FOCs for the second best outcome (SB) of each type of 
farmers are obtained as follows, 
For the low-cost type: 
SB FOC1 :                  ) (
~ 1
) ( 1 1 1 x B a x y p                                                                        (6) 
From (6), the optimal level of land productivity can be obtained and denoted as: 
SB x1 . 
The second-best optimal transfer payment for the low -cost type can be obtained and 
written as, 
                        ) ( ) ( ) , ( 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1
SB SB SB SB x py x a x a a x a T                                         (7) 
 For the high-cost type: 





) ( 1 2 2 2 2 a a x B a x y p                                          (8) 
From (8), the optimal level of land productivity can be obtained and denoted as: 
SB x2 . 
                                                 
3 Proof of binding constraints can be seen in Laffont and Martimort (2002)  (page 42).  15 
 
The second-best optimal transfer payment for the high-cost type can be obtained and 
written as, 
                                  ) ( ) , ( 2 2 2 2 2 2
SB SB SB SB x py x a x a T                                                     (9) 
 
4.  Discussion of Second Best Outcome in Comparison to First Best Outcome 
Equations (2) and (6) indicate that low-cost farmers’ optimal level of productivity is the 
same with or without full information i.e. 
SB FB x x 1 1 . However, equations (3) and (7) 
suggest that with asymmetric information low-cost type farmers receive more transfer 
payments, since  ) , ( ) , ( 1 1 1 1 1 1
FB FB SB SB x a T x a T   0 ) ( 2 1 2 x a a
4. Hence, with hidden 
information, low-cost farmers can earn an extra payment of 2 1 2 ) ( x a a . This extra 
payment or information rent is paid to low-cost farmers to induce them to reveal their 
private information.  
         When equation (8) is compared to equation (4), the high-cost farmers’ marginal 
productivity may decrease or increase depending on whether  1 0  or  1. If 
1 0 , then the marginal productivity of high-cost farmers will decline. On the other 
hand, if  1 then the marginal productivity of high-cost farmers will rise. Graphically, 





                                                 
4  Because
SB FB x x 1 1 ,  0 ) ( 1 2 a a , and  0 2 x which must be true for bioenergy crop  production 
to take place. 16 
 
 
                                                                                 No contract                                                            
                                           ) ( 2 x y                                                           
                                                                                           For ( 1) 
5 
                                                 2 a                                  
                                                                                                         Full info. ( 1)
6 
                                                                                                          





1 2 2 2 a a x B a                                                              For  ( 1 0 ) 
7                              
                                                                                                                         
                         ) (
~ 1
2 2 x B a      
        





1 2 2 2 a a x B a  
                                        
                                                            2 x      
SB x2          
FB x2                
SB x2                x           
      
  Figure 2. Optimal land productivity with and without full information 
           As can be seen in figure 2, the marginal productivity of high-cost farmers will 
either decline or rise depending on whether   1 0  or  1. These results suggest 
that when  1, the optimal level of land productivity will be distorted upward , i.e. 
SB x2
<
FB x2  as shown in the figure above. In contrast, when 1 0 , the optimal level of land 
productivity will be distorted downward, i.e. 
SB x2 >
FB x2 . Thus, with the present of 
asymmetric information, high-cost farmers’ second-best optimal level of land 
productivity will be lower than their first-best full information level if 1, and the 
reverse will be true if  1 0 . Equations (5) and (9) illustrate that 
                                                 
5  1implies that the marginal costs of raising tax revenue to support the government transfer payments      
     are higher than the marginal transfer payments given to the farmers.   
6  1 implies that the marginal costs of raising tax revenue to support the government transfer   
     payments are equal to the marginal transfer payments given to the farmers.   
7  1 0  implies that the marginal costs of raising tax revenue to support the government transfer  
     payments are lower than the marginal transfer payments given to the  farmers.   
  17 
 
) , ( , ) , ( 2 2 2 2 2 2
FB FB SB SB x a T or x a T  only if  
FB SB x or x 2 2 ,  . And this can only be 
true if 1 0 ,  1 or  1. Hence, for the high-cost farmers, whether the optimal 
second-best transfer payments are higher, lower, or equal to the optimal first-best transfer 
payments will depend on the marginal costs of raising tax revenue to support the 
principal’s transfer payments given to biofuel farmers.  If the marginal costs of raising 
tax revenue are high (i.e. if 1), then high-cost farmers for whom the transfer payments 
are mainly intended are worse off due to the effect of information asymmetry. The 
reverse will be true if the marginal costs of raising tax revenue are low (i.e. if  1 0 ). 
In order to distribute the transfer payments efficiently, the principal needs to consider the 
effect of hidden information and design the contract in such a way that low-cost farmers 
have no incentives to imitate high-cost farmers. In this type of contract design, there is a 
tradeoff between the cost of obtaining biofuel farmers’ private information and the social 
benefits associated with the production of bioenergy crops. 
 
 5.  Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper is to apply the principal-agent model to determine an optimal 
contract in the context of information asymmetry between biofuel crop farmers and the 
social planner. The model allows us to take into account that farmers have private 
information on the marginal cost of using land for biofuel crop production. Thus, it 
intends to investigate the effect of this information asymmetry on the optimal level of 
land productivity and social planner’s transfer payments.  
            We consider firstly the farmer’s utility without the contract. Given the current 
situation of bioenergy crop production in the U.S., it is unlikely that farmers will generate 
profits without any monetary help from the social planner. Transfer payments are needed 18 
 
to provide farmers with incentives to grow biofuel crops and gain profits at the same 
time. But the problem arises when farmers have private information. In this case, the 
principal has to design a contract to encourage farmers not only to participate but also to 
reveal their types truthfully using the incentive compatible constraints.    
            Comparisons are made between biofuel farmers’ utilities with and without 
contract. Results show that with the contract and complete information, both low-cost and 
high-cost type farmers raise their optimal level of productivity. Hence, the social planner 
transfer payments may induce farmers to produce more bioenergy crops when the 
information is complete. When the information asymmetry is considered in the model, 
low-cost farmers’ optimal level of productivity remains the same as it is in the first-best 
full information case. However, the transfer payments to low-cost types have increased in 
the second-best case due to the effect of hidden information. The increased amount of 
transfer payments are given to low-cost type farmers to induce them to reveal their true 
types.  
      Finally, in the second-best outcome with asymmetric information, high-cost 
farmers’ optimal level of productivity depends on the marginal costs of raising tax 
revenue to support the government incentive payments.  If the marginal costs of raising 
tax revenue are high, the optimal level of productivity will be distorted upward, i.e. the 
second-best high-cost farmers’ productivity will be lower than its first-best level. The 
reverse will be true if the marginal costs of raising tax revenue are low.  The second-best 
optimal incentive payments made to high-cost farmers also depend on the marginal costs 
of raising tax revenue. With high marginal costs of raising tax revenue, high-cost type 
farmers would receive comparatively low optimal second-best incentive payments. 19 
 
In terms of policy implications, if asymmetric information is present and marginal 
costs of raising tax revenue are high then the government’s biofuel incentive payment 
program may not be an effective tool in inducing biofuel crop production because this 
would result in rewarding low-cost farmers with extra payments while leaving high-cost 
farmers, who should be the main recipients of incentive payments in the first place, to be 
worse off.  For future research, it will be beneficial if we could find a way to empirically 
test the effect of asymmetric information on the government’s biofuel incentive payment 




Ahouissoussi, N. B. 1995. “A Principal-Agent for Regional Pest Control Adoption.” 
Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics. 27 (1995): 301-309. 
 
Chambers, R. 1992. “On the Design of Agricultural Policy Mechanisms.” American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics. 74: 646-654.  
 
Goodhue, R. E., G. Gruere and K. Klonsky. 2003. “Designing Green Payment Programs 
to Protect Environmental Amenities.” Conference paper. Available on-line at: http:// 
www.ecostat.unical.it/ 2003agtradeconf, June 23-26, 2003.  
 
Hall, D. O., and J. I. Scrase. 1998. “Will Biomass be the Environmentally Friendly Fuel 
of the Future?” Biomass and Bioenergy. 15: 357-367. 
 
Laffont, J., and D. Martimort. 2002. “The Theory of Incentives.” Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, New Jersey. 
 
Schneider, U. A., and B. A. McCarl. 2003. “Economic Potential of Biomass Based Fuels 
for Greenhouse Gas Emission Mitigation.” Environmental and Resource Economics. 24: 
291-312. 
 
Segerson, K. 1998. “Uncertainty and Incentives for Nonpoint Pollution Control.” Journal 
of Environmental Economics and Management. 15(1988):87-98. 
 
Wu, J. and B. Babcock. 1995. “Optimal Design of a Voluntary Green Payment Program 
under Asymmetric Information.” Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics. 20: 
316-327. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  